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Abstract 
  
The dominance of English common-law countries in prospects for financial development 
in the legal-origins debate has been debunked by recent findings. Using exchange rate regimes 
and economic/monetary integration oriented hypotheses, this paper proposes an “inflation 
uncertainty theory” in providing theoretical justification and empirical validity as to why French 
civil-law countries have higher levels of financial allocation efficiency. Inflation uncertainty, 
typical of floating exchange rate regimes accounts for the allocation inefficiency of financial 
intermediary institutions in English common-law countries.  As a policy implication, results 
support the benefits of fixed exchange rate regimes in financial intermediary allocation 
efficiency. 
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1. Introduction 
  
 Contrary to mainstream literature (Mundell, 1972; La Porta et al., 1998; Beck et al., 
2003), recent findings have partially rejected the dominance of English common-law countries in 
prospects for financial development (Asongu, 2011). The overwhelming edge of French civil-
law countries in financial intermediary allocation efficiency has reignited the legal-origins debate 
in the law-finance nexus. This paper cuts adrift the mainstream cross-country legal-origins 
approach and uses regional-legal origins to provide theoretical justification and empirical 
validity as to “why” French civil-law countries exhibit higher levels of financial allocation 
efficiency. It is worth noting that recent findings have stopped at “if” French legal systems 
provide for conditions that enhance financial intermediary allocation efficiency. The issue of 
“why” has remained elusive hitherto, which is the concern this work seeks to address. For the 
purpose of clarity and logical presentation of the paper, literature on the law-finance nexus could 
be clubbed into the following strands.  
 The first strand entails a growing body of work which suggests that cross-country 
differences in legal-origin explain cross-country differences in financial development. La Porta 
et al., (1998): hence LLSV (1998) pioneered this strand and ever since many authors have taken 
to them in the assertion that English common-law countries provide for a legal atmosphere that 
fosters conditions for financial development than their French civil-law counterparts. They 
postulate that countries with common-law traditions (French civil-law legacies) express the 
strongest (weakest) legal protection to shareholders and creditors (LLSV, 1998, 2000). The 
margin English legal origin countries exert over countries with French civil-law origin has been 
generalized and extended to many other aspects of management and government: more 
informative accounting standards(LLSV,1998) , better institutions with less corrupt governments 
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(LLSV,1999) and more efficient courts(Djankov et al., 2003). While this strand has been focused 
on elucidating “if” legal origin matters in financial development, the issue of “why” legal origin 
matters remained unaccounted for until Beck et al.(2003) assessed some theories to address it.  
 In the second strand, Beck et al.(2003) account for “why” legal origin matters in finance 
by empirically assessing two channel-based theories. The political channel underlines the 
importance of priorities legal traditions attribute to the rights of individual investors vis-à-vis the 
state. It follows that championing of investors rights should induce favorable conditions for 
financial development. The adaptability channel postulates that legal traditions differ in their 
capacity to adapt to changing and evolving business circumstances. This implies countries in 
which legal systems provide for adjustments in relation to changing and evolving circumstances 
should have a higher propensity to financial development. Thus, this strand solves the “why” 
puzzle in asserting that legal origin matters in financial growth because traditionally, legal 
origins differ in their ability to adapt and adjust to changing and evolving economic conditions.  
 In the third strand we find literature boosting the nexus that financial development 
significantly contributes to a country’s overall economic growth (McKinnon, 1973). This 
optimism is shared and broadened empirically at the country level (King & Levine, 1993; Levine 
& Zervos, 1998; Allen et al., 2005), as well as at industry and firm levels (Jayaratne & Strahan, 
1996; Rajan & Zingales, 1998). 
 The fourth strand addresses the law-finance-growth relationship. It theoretically and 
empirically provides evidence of the link among law, finance and economic growth at firm, 
industry and country levels (Demirguc-Kunt & Maksimovic, 1998; Beck & Levine, 2002). 
 The fifth strand which is for the most part dedicated to sub-Saharan African countries 
was pioneered by the Mundell(1972) conjecture, which emphasized that Anglophone countries 
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shaped by British activism and openness(to experiment) would naturally experience higher levels 
of financial development that their Francophone neighbors(powered by French reliance on 
monetary stability and automaticity)1. Recent literature on the African continent has either 
wholly (Agbor, 2011) or partially (Asongu, 2011) confirmed the edge of English common-law 
countries in growth and finance prospects respectively2. Historically it should be noted that the 
partition of sub-Saharan Africa into French and British spheres in the 19th century resulted in the 
implementation of two distinct colonial policies3. 
 The unique contribution of this paper to the literature is to explain “why” French civil-
law countries experience higher levels of financial intermediary allocation efficiency than 
English common-law countries. The rest of the paper is organized in the following manner. 
Section 2 discusses the links among financial efficiency, inflation and the law-finance theory, 
and presents resulting testable hypotheses. Data sources and methodology are discussed and 
outlined in Section 3 respectively. Empirical analyses and discussion of results are reported in 
Section 4, followed by a conclusion in Section 5.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
                         
1
 “The French and English traditions in monetary theory and history have been different… The French tradition has 
stressed the passive nature of monetary policy and the importance of exchange stability with convertibility; stability 
has been achieved at the expense of institutional development and monetary experience. The British countries by 
opting for monetary independence have sacrificed stability, but gained monetary experience and better developed 
monetary institutions.”(Mundell, 1972; pp.42-43). 
2
 While Agbor (2011) assesses how legal-origin affects economic performance, Asongu (2011) proposes four 
theories in assessing why legal-origin matters in growth and welfare. Both studies are focused on the sub-Saharan 
part of the African continent.  
3
 The British and French implemented two distinct colonial policies. While the French imposed a highly centralized 
bureaucratic system that clearly underlined empire-building, the British on their part administered pragmatic 
decentralized and flexible policies. Economic and business ambitions dominated British colonial activities who 
sought to transform their colonies into commercially viable trading countries through the indirect-rule: producing 
raw material and consuming British manufactures. The French on their part championed imperial ambitions through 
the policy of assimilation.  
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2. Financial efficiency, inflation and law-finance –theory  
 
2.1 Inflation and regional-legal origin  
  
 We postulate that inflation is inherently associated with common-law countries than 
civil-law countries. This is because countries with English legal tradition are inherently opened 
(to capital and trade) and competitive. Trade (exchange rate) reflects inflation especially in 
floating exchange rate regimes. It follows that inflation should be higher in floating (English 
common-law) rate regimes than in fixed (French civil-law) exchange rate regimes (Mundell, 
1972)4.  
 
2.2 Inflation, uncertainty and financial allocation efficiency  
 
2.2.1 Inflation, noise and uncertainty 
 
 Quite often, inflation introduces noise into the price system and this noise leads to 
decisions that, ex-post are mistakes that would not have occurred in the absence of inflationary 
noise. The famous “island” model of Lucas (1972) elucidates this hypothesis. A condition for 
inflation to introduce noise into the system is that inflation must carry with it some uncertainty 
about static and/or intertemporal relative prices. Evidence that inflation and uncertainty travel 
together has been provided by many authors (Okun, 1971; Logue & Willet, 1976; Foster, 1978; 
Engle, 1983; Evans & Wachtel, 1993). However these studies may disagree in some details, 
there does appear to be a consensus that inflation and inflation uncertainty move hand in glove.  
 
 
 
 
                         
4
 “The French and English traditions in monetary theory and history have been different… The French tradition has 
stressed the passive nature of monetary policy and the importance of exchange stability with convertibility; stability 
has been achieved at the expense of institutional development and monetary experience. The British countries by 
opting for monetary independence have sacrificed stability, but gained monetary experience and better developed 
monetary institutions.”(Mundell, 1972; pp.42-43). 
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2.2.2 Why inflation matters in financial allocation efficiency? 
 
 As we must have earlier observed, inflation injects noise into the smooth functioning of 
the price system and thus influence’s decisions of banks and other financial institutions. This 
added noise comes with mistakes in decision making that would not have been made without 
inflation-induced uncertainty. Banks end up holding too much of mobilized funds. Inflation 
therefore leads to a different pattern (ratio) of bank deposits on bank credit (allocation 
efficiency). In substance, inflation is like a distortionary tax that causes a reduction in the bank’s 
allocation efficiency. Thus the allocative cost caused by inflationary noise quantitatively affects 
the ability of a bank to lend mobilized funds because the lending price depends on perceptions of 
tomorrow’s value of money. Since inflation adds noise to the lending price system and therefore 
affects perceptions of the time value of money, the argument for misallocation of mobilized 
funds holds grounds as bank resources maybe shifted to inefficient ends.  As point out by 
Summers (1991)  inflation and its accompanying uncertainty leads to resources being devoted to 
“dealing with” inflation rather than the fundamental issues the banks “really care 
about”(allocation of credit to economic agents). To put this in perspective, with inflation and 
corresponding uncertainty financial institutions tend to employ more inflation forecasters and 
indexation specialists which diverts some proportion of mobilized funds. Indeed financial 
institutions in economies associated with high levels of inflation and uncertainty tend to see 
more recipients of cheques lobbying for faster cheque-clearing services. This constraint requires 
banks to retain a higher proportion of deposits (in a bid to meet-up with the uncertainty in 
demand for liquidity) and this affects their allocation efficiency (bank credit on bank deposits). 
More so bankers( aware inflation will erode the time value of money) are slow to lend-out 
mobilized funds because of uncertainty in the increase of interest rate to compensate(associate) 
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for(to) the inflationary noise It follows that inflation affects financial allocation efficiency 
through misallocation of resources: on the one hand more mobilized funds (deposits) are used to 
fight inflation and on the other hand a greater chunk of mobilized funds is retained by banks to 
assuage the uncertainty of bank-run.  
 
2.3 Testing the “inflation uncertainty theory”  
 
 In order to assess the “inflation uncertainty theory” we shall examining two testable 
hypotheses.  
H1: Inflation is higher in common-law countries due to floating exchange rate regimes, in 
comparison to French civil-law countries with fixed exchange rate regimes.  
 First and foremost, we shall have to cut adrift the legal origins debate that is based on 
colonial legacy at cross-country levels. A more convenient approach is the adoption of 
economic/monetary regional-legal origins. Should we limit our empirical framework to cross-
country level analysis, the basis for exchange rate regimes (on which the concept of inflation is 
founded; Section 2.1) will not be accounted for. Most French civil-law countries are associated 
with monetary regions in which financial discipline and inflation are dictated and controlled 
respectively by regional central banks.  
 Hypothesis 1 will be further elucidated by means of comparative statistics to be outlined 
in Section 3.1.5.  
H2: Inflation reduces financial intermediary allocation efficiency.  
 Testing this hypothesis we entail four steps: 
-Firstly, we confirm that inflation is detrimental to banking system allocation efficiency (and 
robustly financial system allocation efficiency), conditional on other exogenous determinants of 
financial intermediary allocation efficiency;  
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-Secondly, we assess if regional-legal origins explain regulation quality and the rule of law 
(which are used as our endogenous explaining control variables at the second-stage of the TSLS 
approach); 
-Thirdly, we show that regional-legal origins (monetary/economic or both) which determine 
exchange rate regimes are exogenous to inflation and financial intermediary efficiency, 
(conditional on other potential determinants of inflation and financial efficiency); 
-Lastly, we examine if regional-legal origins explain banking system efficiency (and robustly 
financial system efficiency) beyond their ability to explain cross-country (cross-regional) 
variations in inflation; conditional on other potential exogenous determinants of financial 
intermediary efficiency (rule of law and regulation quality)5.  
 
2.4 The concept of financial intermediary efficiency  
 
 Here we neither refer to the profitability-oriented concept of financial efficiency nor to 
the production efficiency of decision making units in the financial sector (through Data 
Envelopment Analysis: DEA). What we seek to address is the ability of banks to effectively 
meet their fundamental role of transforming mobilized deposits into credit for economic 
operators.  
 
3. Data and Methodology  
 
3.1 Data 
 
Our data is obtained from African Development Indicators (ADI) of the Work Bank 
(WB) and the Financial Development and Structure Database (FDSD). Due to limitations in time 
                         
5
 As we have pointed-out in the second-step, other potential determinants of financial efficiency must have 
theoretical basis and empirical validity. Thus, the instruments (regional legal-origin) must explain the rule of law 
and regulation quality before they can be integrated at the second-stage of the TSLS approach as endogenous 
explaining variables of control. This is the purpose of the second-step.  
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series properties of law and regional indicators6, we are obliged to restrict our data span (made-
up of 34 countries) from 1996 to 2008 (see Appendix 3). As we must have earlier emphasized 
we cut adrift the legal origins debate of cross-country levels and focus on cross-regional levels7.  
Inflation data based on Consumer Price Index is obtained from ADI of the WB.  
 
3.1.1 Financial intermediary efficiency  
 
 Borrowing from Asongu (2011) countries with French civil-law legacy will turn to 
experience higher levels of financial intermediary allocation efficiency both at bank (banking 
system efficiency) and economic (financial system efficiency) levels. In accordance with the 
Financial Development and Structure Database (FDSD) we measure banking system efficiency 
and financial system efficiency with “bank credit on bank deposits: Bcbd” and “financial system 
credit on financial system deposits: Fcfd” respectively. Bcbd can robustly be checked by Fcfd as 
it accounts for over 87% of its variations (see Appendix 4).   
 
3.1.2 Instrumental variables  
 
 After scrutinizing all economic/monetary regions in Africa (Appendix 1), we narrow 
down member states of regions with respect to constraints of data availability (Appendix 2) 
before selecting regions based on testable hypotheses, legal origins and correlation analysis 
(Appendix 3). We choose two economic/monetary regions dominated by French legal traditions 
(CEMAC and UEMOA) which constitute the CFA zone.  We also select two economic regions 
                         
6
 For regional data, most economic regions in Africa were created in the 1990’s in the heat of structural adjustment 
policies imposed by the International Monetary Fund. For law data, the World Bank began collecting indicators on 
the quality of law in Africa only after the pioneering work of LLSV (1998) was first published as working paper at 
the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) in 1996. 
7
 A more convenient approach is the adoption of economic/monetary regional-legal origin. Should we limit our 
empirical framework to country-level analysis, the basis of exchange rate regimes (on which the concept of inflation 
is founded; Section 2.1) will not be accounted for. Most French civil-law countries are associated with monetary 
regions in which financial discipline and inflation are dictated and controlled respectively by regional central banks. 
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dominated by English common-law origin (SADC and COMESA). Beside the motivation of 
testable hypotheses, the choice of these regions is also based on correlation analysis to avoid 
problems related to overparametizing and multicolinearity (Appendix 4).  
 
3.1.3 Control variables 
 
 In accordance with the literature (Levine & King, 1993; Hassan et al., 2011; Asongu, 
2011) we shall control for trade, population growth, GDP per capita growth and government 
expenditure in the finance regressions. The control variables are obtained from ADI of the WB. 
 
3.1.4 Choice of endogenous explaining variables for control at the second-stage of the TSLS 
 
a) Regulatory Quality  
 
 According to the World Bank the quality of regulation measures perceptions on the 
ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that enable 
and foster private sector development. The concept is appreciated by both representative and 
non-representative sources. The indicator is measured in percentile rank from 0 to 100.  
 
b) Rule of Law 
 
 This indicator captures perceptions on the extent to which agents abide by and have 
confidence in the rules of society, particularly the quality of property rights, contract 
enforcement, the courts, the police, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence. It is 
appreciated in percentile rank from 0 to 100 from a plethora of criteria with representative and 
non-representative sources.   
 What is worth noting is that, these two measures incorporate the four indicators 
considered by Beck et al. (2003) in theorizing the political and adaptability channels of law. 
These endogenous explaining variables of control must be empirically verified at the second-step 
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of the validation of hypothesis 2 before they can be used at the fourth-step (second-stage 
regressions in the Two-Stage Least Squares method).  
 
3.1.5 Brief comparative analyses from Table 1 
 
 The last column of Table 1 depicts that relative to French-civil law regions, common-law 
regions have on average higher levels of inflation. This mean is 2.811% for the Franc zone and 
52.188 %( 11.869%) for the SADC (COMESA) region.  The corresponding high uncertainty 
associated with inflation is measured by the standard deviation. While on average the Franc Zone 
has an inflation-uncertainty of 10.474% those of SADC and COMESA are 367.38% and 
13.647% respectively. Thus this is confirmation of Hypothesis 18.  
 As expected, regulatory quality, trade and GDP per capita growth are higher in English 
common-law regions than in French civil-law regions. This is consistent with the law-finance 
literature (LLSV, 1998; Beck et al., 2003; Agbor, 2011). Also the presence of higher levels of 
allocation efficiency in French civil-law regions confirm recent findings (Asongu, 2011) on 
which the object of our work is based. 
 
3.2 Methodology  
 
 In accordance with the law-finance literature (Beck et al., 2003; Agbor, 2011) we use the 
Two-Stage-Least-Squares (TSLS) with dummies of regional origins as instrumental variables. 
Beside the many advantages of using TSLS, the object of our paper (which is to assess if 
regional origins affect financial efficiency through inflation) requires an Instrumental Variable 
(hence IV) estimation technique. This IV approach will entail the following steps: 
                         
8
 H1: Inflation  is higher in common-law countries  
 
 13
- justify the object of a TSLS over an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimation method through 
the Hausman test for endogeneity; 
- show that the instruments (regional origins) explain the endogenous components of the 
explaining variable (inflation), conditional on other covariates (control variables); 
-assess the validity of the instruments through an Over-Identifying Restriction (OIR) test.  
 Above steps entail the following models: 
   
First stage regression:  
 
++= itit BritishInflation )(10 γγ itFrench)(2γ υα ++ itiX
                                             (1) 
 
Second stage regression: 
 
++= itit InflationfficiencyFinanciale )(10 γγ +itiXβ µ
                                                (2) 
  
 In the two equations, X is the set of exogenous variables that are included in some of the 
second-stage regressions. For the first and second-stage equations, v  and u, respectively denote 
the error terms. Instrumental variables are the five regional origin dummies.  
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              Table 1: Comparative Summary Statistics  
 
Stats 
 
Legal-
origin 
 
Regional 
origin 
Efficiency Law Control Variables Instruments(Regions)  
Inflation Bank Finance Reg. Rule of  
Trade 
 
GDPpcg 
Pop. 
Growth 
Gov. 
Exp. 
French Civil Law Regions Common-law 
Bcbd Fcfd Quality Law CEMAC UEMOA CFA.ZONE SADC COMESA 
 
 
Mean 
French 
Civil 
Law 
CEMAC 0.847 0.827 0.217 0.150 78.018 1.105 2.387 10.526 --- --- --- --- --- 1.182 
UEMOA 0.831 0.832 0.323 0.283 60.377 0.889 2.906 12.676 --- --- --- --- --- 3.957 
CFA.ZONE 0.837 0.830 0.282 0.232 68.073 0.972 2.706 11.810 --- --- --- --- --- 2.811 
Common 
Law 
SADC 0.611 0.737 0.420 0.430 97.682 3.235 1.914 16.546 --- --- --- --- --- 52.188 
COMESA 0.645 0.681 0.326 0.352 80.773 2.112 2.289 14.443 --- --- --- --- --- 11.869 
Data 0.708 0.750 0.332 0.330 77.646 2.202 2.336 14.147 0.131 0.210 0.342 0.263 0.289 18.844 
                 
 
 
S.D 
French 
Civil 
Law 
CEMAC 0.316 0.297 0.124 0.122 39.014 5.202 0.614 3.860 --- --- --- --- --- 13.456 
UEMOA 0.228 0.224 0.125 0.155 19.620 4.422 0.442 4.441 --- --- --- --- --- 7.600 
CFA.ZONE 0.265 0.252 0.135 0.157 30.841 4.723 0.572 4.335 --- --- --- --- --- 10.474 
Common 
Law 
SADC 0.289 0.607 0.194 0.205 45.132 3.436 0.767 6.086 --- --- --- --- --- 367.38 
COMESA 0.242 0.278 0.169 0.222 52.630 3.516 1.432 5.476 --- --- --- --- --- 13.647 
Data 0.301 0.409 0.171 0.211 39.886 4.246 1.023 5.418 0.338 0.408 0.474 0.440 0.453 193.57 
                 
 
 
Min. 
French 
Civil 
Law 
CEMAC 0.188 0.178 0.078 0.019 25.710 -11.137 1.555 2.650 --- --- --- --- --- -100.00 
UEMOA 0.207 0.243 0.083 0.014 29.993 -29.63 2.092 6.484 --- --- --- --- --- -3.502 
CFA.ZONE 0.188 0.178 0.078 0.014 25.710 -29.630 1.555 2.650 --- --- --- --- --- -100.00 
Common 
Law 
SADC 0.133 0.137 0.044 0.024 33.491 -7.797 0.548 6.331 --- --- --- --- --- -100.00 
COMESA 0.177 0.253 0.044 0.029 17.859 -15.156 -1.075 4.588 --- --- --- --- --- -2.405 
Data 0.133 0.137 0.044 0.014 17.859 -29.630 -1.075 2.650 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -100.00 
                 
 
 
Max. 
French 
Civil 
Law 
CEMAC 1.718 1.646 0.580 0.457 156.86 29.062 3.826 24.196 --- --- --- --- --- 12.431 
UEMOA 1.244 1.189 0.698 0.519 104.39 10.483 3.699 25.162 --- --- --- --- --- 50.734 
CFA.ZONE 1.718 1.646 0.698 0.519 156.86 29.062 3.826 25.162 --- --- --- --- --- 50.734 
Common 
Law 
SADC 1.400 2.606 0.792 0.810 209.41 17.114 3.165 35.138 --- --- --- --- --- 4145.1 
COMESA 1.413 1.615 0.792 0.810 255.01 10.655 10.564 31.237 --- --- --- --- --- 132.82 
Data 1.718 2.606 0.792 0.810 255.01 29.062 10.564 35.138 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 4145.1 
                 
 
 
Obs. 
French 
Civil 
Law 
CEMAC 65 60 50 50 65 65 65 65 --- --- --- --- --- 64 
UEMOA 104 104 80 80 84 104 104 95 --- --- --- --- --- 91 
CFA.ZONE 169 164 130 130 149 169 169 159 --- --- --- --- --- 155 
Common 
Law 
SADC 130 126 100 100 130 130 117 115 --- --- --- --- --- 128 
COMESA 140 137 110 109 141 143 143 141 --- --- --- --- --- 143 
Data 489 477 380 379 472 494 481 454 494 494 494 494 494 465 
S.D: Standard Deviation. Min: Minimum. Max: Maximum. Obs: Observations. Bcbd: Bank credit on Bank deposits. Fcfd: Financial system credit on Financial system deposits. Reg: Regulation. Popg: 
Population growth. Gov.Exp: Government Expenditure. GDPpcg: GDP per capita growth. CEMAC: Economic and Monetary Community of Central African States. UEMOA: Economic and Monetary 
Community of West African States. CFA ZONE: FRANC ZONE. SADC:  Southern African Development Community. COMESA: Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa.  
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4. Cross-region regressions 
 
 Section 3.1.5 has partially settled the first hypothesis of whether common-law countries 
exhibit higher levels of inflation and inflation uncertainty. In this section we shall empirically 
confirm Hypothesis 1 and address the second hypothesis.  
 
4.1 Inflation, efficiency, law and regional origin 
 
 This section presents results for steps 1 and 2 of Hypothesis 2.  We assess the importance 
of inflation in explaining financial intermediary efficiency (Panel A of Table 2 for step 1 of 
Hypothesis 2). We unconditionally regress banking system efficiency on inflation (Model 1) and 
test for the significance of inflation as a detriment to banking efficiency. Next we control for 
other potential determinants of banking efficiency (Model 2) before robustly validating our 
results with financial system efficiency regressions of the same order (Model 1* and Model 2*). 
All results are significant both at coefficient (significance of t-statistics for the inflation variable) 
and overall model (significance of Fisher statistics) levels. The negative sign of the significant 
inflation estimate point to the detrimental effect inflation and corresponding inflation uncertainty 
exert on financial intermediary efficiency.  
 Panel B of Table 2 addresses the second-step of Hypothesis 2. This step is essential for 
our choice of endogenous explaining control variables at the second-stage of the TSLS 
estimation method. In practice and fact, control variables must a priori be endogenous to 
(explainable by) instruments both from theoretical and empirical perspectives. Literature has 
already addressed the theoretical foundation (LLSV, 1998; Beck et al., 2003) where much 
emphasis is laid on the edge common-law countries have on the quality of regulation and rule of 
law over French civil-law countries. The comparative summary statistics depicted in Table 1 
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justify this assertion. But we cannot limit ourselves at those because our objective is not to prove 
the edge one legal system has over the other. Our law variables are essentially control variables 
and therefore only their endogenous quality with respect to regional-legal origins is of interest to 
us. In other words, we are interested in pointing-out that the endogenous components of the rule 
of law and quality of regulation can be explained by the instruments.  
 
Table 2: Regressions for First and Second steps of Hypothesis 2 
 Panel A :First-Step of Hypothesis 2 
  Banking System Efficiency Financial System Efficiency 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 1* Model 2* 
  Bcbd Bcbd Fcfd Fcfd 
Constant 0.722*** 1.070*** 0.768*** 1.165*** 
  (51.50) (15.41) (39.35) (11.49) 
Inflation -0.0001** -0.005*** -0.0001* -0.007*** 
  (-2.448) (-4.962) (-1.820) (-3.668) 
 
 
 
 
Control     
Variables 
Trade --- -0.002*** --- -0.003*** 
 
 (-5.154)  (-6.027) 
GDPpcg --- -0.007* --- -0.010* 
 
 (-1.965)  (-1.860) 
Pop. Growth --- -0.032** --- -0.056*** 
 
 (-2.185)  (-2.684) 
Gov. Exp. --- -0.003 --- 0.006 
 
 (-1.404)  (1.481) 
 
Fisher test 5.993** 11.321*** 3.313* 10.579*** 
Adjusted R² 0.010 0.112 0.005 0.107 
Observations  460 409 450 399 
 Panel B: Second-Step of Hypothesis 2 
  
      Regulatory Quality          Rule of Law 
  Model 3 Model 4 Model 3* Model 4* 
 
French Civil-
law regions 
(Instruments) 
UEMOA 0.323*** --- 0.283*** --- 
 (12.29)  (9.364)  
CEMAC 0.217*** --- 0.150*** --- 
 (6.527)  (3.927) 
 
 
CFA.ZONE --- 0.282*** --- 0.232*** 
  (13.59)  (9.698) 
English 
Common-law 
regions 
(Instruments) 
SADC 0.339*** 0.339*** 0.339*** 0.339*** 
 (13.34) (13.24) (11.58) (11.48) 
COMESA 0.203*** 0.203*** 0.227*** 0.227*** 
 (8.375) (8.318) (8.114) (8.045) 
 
Fisher test 145.87*** 189.76*** 105.43*** 135.77*** 
Adjusted R² 0.605 0.599 0.525 0.517 
Observations  380 380 379 379 
*, **, ***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Student t-statistics are presented in brackets. F-test: Fisher-test. Bcbd: Bank 
credit on Bank deposits. Fcfd: Financial system credit on Financial system deposits. Pop: Population. Gov.Exp: Government Expenditure. 
GDPpcg: GDP per capita growth. CEMAC: Economic and Monetary Community of Central African States. UEMOA: Economic and 
Monetary Community of West African States. CFA ZONE: FRANC ZONE. SADC:  Southern African Development Community. COMESA: 
Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa. 
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Panel B of Table 2 therefore assesses the importance of regional-legal origin in 
explaining cross-regional variances in the rule of law and regulation quality. We regress our law 
indicators on the UEMOA, CEMAC, CFA-ZONE, SADC and COMESA regional origin dummy 
variables and also test for their joint significance (Fisher test). Results show that distinguishing 
regions by legal origin helps explain cross-regional differences in the rule of law and quality of 
regulation. These findings are in accordance with the literature as pointed-out above. Therefore 
in this second-step of Hypothesis 2, we have empirically justified the law variables we shall use 
as endogenous explaining variables of control at the second-stage of the TSLS methodology.  
 
4.2 Regional origin, inflation and financial allocation efficiency   
 
 In this section, results in Table 3 present cross-region regressions to assess the 
importance of regional-legal origin in explaining cross-regional differences in financial system 
efficiency on the one hand and inflation on the other hand. Thus the third-step of Hypothesis 2 is 
looked at.  Results for model 7(7*) confirm Hypothesis 1 in asserting that common-law regions 
exhibit higher levels of inflation than French civil-law regions. It is also worth noting that these 
results confirm the first condition for the TSLS methodology where-by, the instruments(regions) 
must explain the endogenous explaining variable (inflation) conditional on other potential 
determinants of inflation(control variables). Results for UEMOA and CEMAC are robust to that 
of the CFA-ZONE.  
 Models 5(5*) and 6(6*) assess the importance of legal origin in explaining cross-region 
variances in financial efficiency. Banking system efficiency results are robust to those of 
financial system efficiency both in terms of estimated coefficients and joint significance of 
regional instruments (Fisher statistics).  
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Table 3: Allocation efficiency, inflation and regional origin regressions 
 Third-Step of Hypothesis 2 
  Efficiency and Inflation(First-Stage regressions) 
  Banking Syst. Efficiency Financial Syst Efficiency Inflation 
  Model 5 Model 6 Model 5* Model 6* Model 7 Model 7* 
  Bcbd Bcbd Fcfd Fcfd Inflation Inflation 
 
French Civil-
law regions 
(Instruments) 
UEMOA 0.661*** --- 0.669*** --- -1.433 --- 
 (14.10)  (10.74)  (-0.787)  
CEMAC 0.556*** --- 0.550*** --- -3.468* --- 
 (10.13)  (7.321)  (-1.862)  
CFA.ZONE --- 0.545*** --- 0.549*** --- -5.449*** 
  (13.65)  (10.49)  (-3.912) 
 
English 
Common-
law regions 
(Instruments) 
SADC 0.105** 0.119*** 0.260*** 0.274*** 4.433*** 4.501*** 
 (2.332) (2.513) (4.304) (4.408) (3.015) (3.002) 
COMESA 0.286*** --- 0.284*** --- 6.260*** --- 
 (7.169)  (5.312)  (4.392)  
 
 
 
Control 
Variables 
Trade 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.004*** --- --- 
 (9.928) (13.62) (7.069) (10.07)   
GDPpcg 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.012** 0.011* --- --- 
 (3.311) (3.001) (2.094) (1.902)   
Pop.growth --- --- --- --- 2.252*** 3.124*** 
     (4.598) (6.820) 
Gov. Exp. --- --- --- ---- -0.084 -0.013 
     (-1.141) (-0.181) 
 
F-test(for Instruments) 234.67*** 303.37*** 139.60*** 189.63*** 30.77*** 39.53*** 
Adjusted R² 0.750 0.722 0.647 0.624 0.296 0.266 
Observations  467 467 455 455 428 428 
Bcbd: Bank credit on Bank deposits. Fcfd: Financial system credit on Financial system deposits. Pop: Population. Gov.Exp: Government 
Expenditure. GDPpcg: GDP per capita growth.*, **, ***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Student t-statistics are presented 
in brackets. F-test: Fisher-test. Syst: System. CEMAC: Economic and Monetary Community of Central African States. UEMOA: Economic and 
Monetary Community of West African States. CFA ZONE: FRANC ZONE. SADC:  Southern African Development Community. COMESA: 
Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa. 
  
 
4. 2 Second-Stage Inflation and Financial efficiency regressions   
 
 This section presents results on the fourth-step of Hypothesis 2. Table 4 addresses two 
main issues: (1) the concern of whether the exogenous components of the inflation indicator 
explain financial intermediary efficiency; (2) the issue of if regional-legal origin explains 
financial intermediary efficiency through some other mechanisms beside the inflation channel. 
To make this assessment we use the TSLS regressions. The significance of the estimated 
coefficient of inflation in Model 8(8*) addresses the first issue. The second issue is addressed by 
the test for the overidentifying restrictions (OIR). The null hypothesis of the OIR-test is that 
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regional-legal origin dummies (instruments) are not correlated with the error term in the equation 
of interest (equation 2). Thus the rejection of null hypothesis of the OIR-test is the rejection of 
the view that regional-legal origin explains financial intermediary efficiency only through the 
inflation channel. Thus when other potential exogenous determinants of financial efficiency are 
controlled for, the OIR-test becomes a general specification test for the validity of instruments 
(regional-legal origin).   
Although the first issue is addressed in Model 8, rejection of the null hypothesis of the 
OIR test shows that regional-legal origin explains banking system efficiency through some other 
mechanisms than the inflation channel. Models 9(9*) and 10(10*) address the second issue with 
regard to regulation quality and the rule of law respectively. Model 9 on banking system 
efficiency (that is robust to Model 9* on financial system efficiency) attest to the fact that 
regional-legal origin does not explain cross-country differences in financial intermediary 
efficiency beyond the inflation channel when the law channel of regulation-quality is controlled 
for. Evidence of this is provided by the result of the OIR-test which fails the reject the null 
hypothesis. On the other hand, when the rule of law channel is controlled for, as expressed in 
Model 10(10*) for banking system efficiency (financial system efficiency), there is failure to 
reject the null hypothesis (rejection of the null hypothesis) of the OIR-test. What do these results 
tell us; they point to the fact that regional-legal origin does not explain banking system efficiency 
through some other mechanisms other than the inflation channel when the rule of law channel is 
controlled for (Model 10). However, from a financial system perspective, even when the rule of 
law channel is controlled for, regional-legal origin still explains financial system efficiency 
through some other mechanisms than the inflation channel (Model 10*). This could be explained 
by the complexity of the financial system in developing countries which entails much more 
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implicit variables of law (in micro financial institutions and local co-operatives) than in the 
formal banking sector (banking system) regulated by the governments and central banks.  
Another crucial aspect worth noting is the sign of the estimated coefficients. In the 
absence of other potential determinants of financial efficiency (absence of endogenous variables 
of control) the inflation coefficients reflect a wrong positive sign (Models 8 and 8*). However, 
when law is controlled for, the inflation coefficients have the right negative signs (Models 9(9*) 
and 10(10*)). The validity our TSLS estimation method is justified by the rejection of the null 
hypothesis of the Hausman test in all 6 regressions. This rejection suggests estimates by OLS are 
not consistent due to endogeneity.  
  
Table 4: Allocation efficiency and inflation channel regressions 
 Fourth-Step of Hypothesis 2 
 Financial Allocation Efficiency(Second-Stage regressions) 
  Banking System Efficiency Financial System Efficiency 
  Model  8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 8* Model 9* Model 10* 
  Bcbd Bcbd Bcbd Fcfd Fcfd Fcfd 
Inflation 
Channel 
Inflation 0.013*** -0.007* -0.007* 0.015*** -0.005* -0.005 
 (3.180) (-1.835) (-1.745) (3.227) (-1.749) (-1.627) 
 
Control 
Variables 
Reg. Quality --- 2.581*** --- --- 2.554*** --- 
  (6.183)   (8.274)  
Rule of Law --- --- 2.515*** --- --- 2.494*** 
   (5.811)   (7.624) 
Hausman test 172.674*** 302.729*** 359.423*** 200.7*** 116.208*** 197.262*** 
OIR(Sargan)  test 9.299* 1.587 4.236 6.729 2.225 6.427** 
P-values [0.054] [0.662] [0.120] [0.150] [0.526] [0.040] 
Adjusted R² 0.012 0.019 0.005 0.007 0.026 0.008 
Observations 460 353 352 450 345 344 
 
Instruments 
(Economic/ 
Monetary 
Regions) 
French  Civil-
Law 
UEMOA UEMOA CFA 
ZONE 
UEMOA UEMOA CFA 
ZONE CEMAC CEMAC CEMAC CEMAC 
English 
Common-Law 
SADC SADC SADC SADC SADC SADC 
COMESA COMESA COMESA COMESA COMESA COMESA 
*, **, ***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Bcbd: Bank credit on Bank deposits. Fcfd: Financial system credit on Financial 
system deposits. Reg: Regulation. . (): z-statistics. Chi-square statistics for Hausman test. LM statistics for Sargan test. [ ]: p-values. OIR: 
Overidentifying restriction test. CEMAC: Economic and Monetary Community of Central African States. UEMOA: Economic and Monetary 
Community of West African States. CFA ZONE: FRANC ZONE. SADC:  Southern African Development Community. COMESA: Common 
Market for Eastern and Southern Africa. 
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5. Conclusion 
 
 While recent literature (Asongu, 2011) has debunked the dominance of English 
common-law countries in prospects for financial development, it has failed to establish 
empirically why French civil-law countries exert such overwhelming dominance in financial 
intermediary efficiency over their counterparts with common-law origin. In this paper, we have 
presented an “inflation uncertainty theory” in providing theoretical validity and empirical 
justification as to why countries with French legal origin have an edge in financial allocation 
efficiency. In cementing the Asongu (2011) hypothesis we have cut adrift the legal origins 
debate at cross-country level by using exchange rate regimes and economic/monetary integration 
oriented hypotheses. This shift in approach is premised on the fact that the concept of inflation 
expressed by exchange rate regimes cannot be accounted for at country-level because most 
French civil-law countries are associated with monetary regions in which financial discipline and 
inflationary targets are dictated and controlled respectively by the regional central banks.  
 Our results show that inflation uncertainty that is typical of floating exchange rate 
regimes accounts for the allocation inefficiency of financial intermediary institutions in English 
common-law countries when other potential determinants of financial allocation efficiency are 
controlled for. As a policy implication, results support the benefits of fixed exchange rate 
regimes in financial intermediary allocation efficiency.  
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: Presentation of  Economic and Monetary Regions 
Regions Definition Member states Num. 
ECOWAS 
(CDEAO) 
Economic Community of 
West African States 
Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde(1976), Côte d’Ivoire, 
Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, 
Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone , Togo,  
Mauritania(2000).  (5/1975)                                                                        
 
15 
 
UEMOA 
West African Economic 
and Monetary Union         
Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau 
(5/1997) °, Mali, Niger, Senegal, and Togo. (1/1994) 
8 
ECCAS 
(UDEAC)* 
Economic Community of 
Central African States 
Angola(1999)°, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African 
Republic, Chad, D.R.Congo, Equatorial Guinea, 
Gabon, Congo, Rwanda, Sao Tomé and Principe.( 
1985) 
11 
 
CEMAC 
Economic and Monetary 
Authority of Central 
Africa 
Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, 
Equatorial Guinea, and Gabon. (1999) 
6 
 
CFA 
ZONE 
 
CEMAC plus UEMOA  
Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, 
Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte 
d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal, and 
Togo(9/1939) 
 
14 
 
SADC 
 
South  African 
Development Community  
Angola, Botswana, D.R Congo(1997)°, Lesotho, 
Malawi, Mauritius(1995)°, Mozambique, Namibia 
(1990)°, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe, 
South Africa(1990)°, Seychelles(2004-2007°) and 
Madagascar(2005)° (1980) 
 
 
15 
SACU  South Africa Customs 
Union 
South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland. 
(1970) 
4 
EAC  East African Community  Burundi (2007), Kenya, Rwanda (2007), Tanzania and 
Uganda. (2001) 
5 
COMESA Common Market for 
Eastern and Southern 
Africa  
Burundi, Comoros, D.R Congo, Djibouti, 
Egypt(1999)°, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Libya(2006)°, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Rwanda, 
Seychelles(2001)°, Sudan, Swaziland, Uganda, 
Zambia, Zimbabwe.(1994)   
 
19 
IGAD Intergovernmental  
Authority on Development  
Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea (1993)°, Kenya, Somalia, 
Sudan, Uganda. (1986) 
7 
UMA  Arab Maghreb  Union  Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Libya, Mauritania (1989) 5 
Countries with dates in brackets are non-founding members. ° Date of entry into regional community. Bold dates in brackets represent 
creation dates.  Countries in Italics have withdrawn their membership. * Founded in 1985 but became effective only by 1999.  Num: 
Number. 
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Appendix 2: Selected regions and countries(based on data availability) 
Regions Member states  Number 
ECOWAS 
(CDEAO) 
Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde(1976)°, Côte d’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, 
Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and 
Togo.(5/1975)                                                                         
       13 
UEMOA Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau (5/1997) °, Mali, 
Niger, Senegal, and Togo. (1/1994) 
8 
ECCAS 
(UDEAC)* 
Angola(1999)°, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad,  
Gabon, Congo and  Rwanda.( 1985) 
8 
CEMAC Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo and Gabon. (1999) 5 
 
CFA ZONE 
Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Gabon, Benin, 
Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal, and 
Togo.(9/1939) 
13 
SADC Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius (1995)°, Mozambique, 
Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and South Africa(1990)°. (1980) 
10 
SACU  South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland. (1970) 4 
EAC   Kenya and Tanzania. (2001) 2 
COMESA Burundi, Egypt(1999)°,Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Rwanda, 
Seychelles(2001)°, Sudan, Swaziland and Zambia.(1994)   
11 
IGAD  Kenya and Sudan. (1986) 2 
UMA  Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia. (1989) 3 
Countries with dates in brackets are non-founding members. ° Date of entry into regional community. Bold dates in brackets represent 
creation dates.   
 
Appendix 3: Selected regions based on testable hypotheses and correlation analysis 
Legal-Origin Regional Origin Type of Integration Number 
French Civil-Law 
Regions 
CEMAC Monetary and Economic 5 
UEMOA Monetary and Economic 8 
CFA ZONE Monetary 13 
English Common-Law 
Regions 
SADC Economic 10 
COMESA Economic 11 
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               Appendix 4: Correlation Analysis 
Financial  Intermediary  Development  Law   Control Variables Instrumental  Variables 
Depth Efficiency Activity Size Reg. 
Qua 
Rule 
of  
Law 
 
Infl. 
 
Tra 
de 
 
Popg 
Gov. 
Exp. 
 
GDPg 
GDP 
pcg 
 
ECO 
WAS 
 
UE 
MOA 
 
EC 
CAS 
 
CE 
MAC 
 
CFA 
Zone 
 
SA 
DC 
 
SA 
CU 
E 
A 
C 
CO 
ME 
SA 
 
IGAD 
U 
M 
A 
 
M
2 
Fd 
gdp 
Bc 
bd 
Fcfd Pcrb Pcrb
of 
Dba 
cba 
1.0 0.97 -0.07 -0.00 0.74 0.59 0.39 0.40 0.63 -0.06 0.30 -0.46 0.33 -0.05 0.05 -0.14 -0.20 -0.34 -0.28 -0.37 -0.03 -0.00 -0.02 0.21 -0.07 0.35 M2 
 1.00 -0.04 0.06 0.80 0.68 0.46 0.48 0.68 -0.05 0.32 -0.49 0.37 -0.01 0.10 -0.21 -0.27 -0.34 -0.29 -0.44 0.07 0.10 -0.01 0.25 -0.05 0.31 Fdgdp 
  1.00 0.87 0.40 0.42 0.25 0.19 -0.00 -0.11 -0.23 0.01 -0.07 -0.09 -0.08 0.08 0.21 0.15 0.18 0.31 -0.19 0.07 -0.09 -0.13 -0.03 0.03 Bcbd 
   1.00 0.53 0.67 0.28 0.30 0.10 -0.08 -0.23 -0.04 0.04 -0.09 -0.07 -0.00 0.10 0.08 0.07 0.14 -0.01 0.27 -0.09 -0.13 -0.05 0.02 Fcfd 
    1.00 0.93 0.51 0.61 0.62 -0.06 0.10 -0.41 0.24 -0.02 0.07 -0.16 -0.16 -0.27 -0.24 -0.31 0.10 0.20 -0.03 0.10 -0.04 0.34 Pcrb 
     1.00 0.45 0.57 0.53 -0.05 0.05 -0.35 0.26 -0.03 0.05 -0.18 -0.16 -0.23 -0.21 -0.29 0.18 0.34 -0.03 0.04 -0.04 0.25 Pcrbof 
      1.00 0.48 0.45 -0.09 0.21 -0.29 0.27 0.06 0.13 -0.14 -0.01 -0.25 -0.23 -0.18 0.23 0.32 0.11 -0.04 -0.06 0.29 Dbacba 
       1.00 0.79 -0.09 0.04 -0.27 0.19 0.02 0.08 -0.05 -0.02 -0.43 -0.26 -0.20 0.30 0.32 0.09 -0.02 -0.10 0.16 Reg.Qua 
        1.00 -0.09 0.23 -0.34 0.34 0.00 0.08 -0.05 -0.11 -0.47 -0.33 -0.33 0.28 0.30 -0.03 0.06 -0.24 0.16 Rule of L 
         1.00 0.10 0.03 -0.14 0.07 0.07 -0.04 -0.03 0.10 -0.03 -0.05 0.10 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.00 -0.02 Inflation 
          1.00 -0.40 0.37 -0.01 0.08 -0.16 -0.20 -0.43 -0.26 -0.20 0.31 0.35 -0.15 0.05 -0.19 -0.02 Trade 
           1.00 -0.33 0.22 -0.01 0.30 0.29 0.15 0.01 0.26 -0.23 -0.29 0.08 -0.02 0.03 -0.30 Popg 
            1.00 -0.02 0.06 -0.11 -0.13 -0.19 -0.27 -0.31 0.25 0.50 0.00 0.03 -0.03 0.08 Gov. Exp. 
             1.00 0.97 -0.03 -0.09 0.02 -0.09 -0.14 0.10 -0.04 0.00 -0.01 0.03 -0.00 GDPg 
              1.00 -0.09 -0.15 -0.01 -0.10 -0.20 0.14 0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.06 GDPpcg 
               1.00 0.71 -0.37 -0.28 0.41 -0.43 -0.24 -0.17 -0.46 -0.17 -0.21 ECOWAS 
                1.00 -0.26 -0.20 0.71 -0.30 -0.17 -0.12 -0.32 -0.12 -0.15 UEMOA 
                 1.00 0.75 0.30 -0.16 -0.17 -0.12 -0.04 -0.12 -0.15 ECCAS 
                  1.00 0.53 -0.23 -0.13 -0.09 -0.24 -0.09 -0.11 CEMAC 
                   1.00 -0.43 -0.24 -0.17 -0.46 -0.17 -0.21 Fr. ZONE 
                    1.00 0.57 0.12 0.14 -0.14 -0.17 SADC 
                     1.00 -0.08 -0.02 -0.08 -0.10 SACU 
                      1.00 0.10 0.47 -0.06 EAC 
                       1.00 0.36 -0.18 COMESA 
                        1.00 -0.06 IGAD 
                         1.00 UMA 
M2: Monetary Base. Fdgdp: Financial system deposits. Bcbd: Bank credit on Bank deposits. Fcfd: Financial system credit on Financial system deposits. Pcrb: Private domestic credit by deposit banks. Pcrbof: Private domestic credit by 
financial institutions. Dbacba: Deposit bank assets on central bank assets plus deposit bank assets. Reg.Qua: Regulation Quality. Infl: Inflation. Popg: Population growth. Gov.Exp: Government Expenditure. GDPpcg: GDP per capita 
growth. CEMAC: Economic and Monetary Community of Central African States. UEMOA: Economic and Monetary Community of West African States. CFA ZONE: FRANC ZONE. SADC:  Southern African Development 
Community. COMESA: Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa. ECOWAS: Economic Community of West African States. ECCAS: Economic Community of Central African States. SACU: Southern African customs Union. 
EAC: East African Community. IGAD: Intergovernmental Authority on Development. UMA: Arab Maghreb Union. 
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